Egypt Has Violated Its Peace Treaty With Israel. It Must Face Consequences | Opinion

Is Egypt in violation of its 1979 peace treaty with Israel? It would appear so.

In 1979, Egypt made history as the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, building on a set of two foundational documents widely referred to as the Camp David Accords. For decades, the peace between the two countries has been a cold one. Anti-Israel rhetoric has remained alarmingly high in Egypt, while people-to-people connections have been abysmally low. Nevertheless, the peace has held.

Recently, however, the war in Gaza has put this peace to the test. Revelations about dozens of Hamas tunnels—some of them quite large—are raising questions about Egypt’s adherence to the agreement that has yielded Cairo billions of dollars in U.S. taxpayer funds. The tunnels, stretching from Gaza into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, are believed to have served as military supply lines for the terrorist group. In addition to likely facilitating the import of hard currency to pay Hamas fighters, the tunnels played a role in allowing the group’s leaders and fighters to rotate in and out of the enclave for training and guidance from its patrons.

The 1979 peace treaty outlined a series of obligations for both countries to avoid conflict and ensure mutual security. The pact was “intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis.”

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

So much for that. Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will.

Either way, it’s a serious problem.

According to the Israeli military’s chief spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, the Philadelphi Corridor has served as “the oxygen line of Hamas,” enabling regular weapons smuggling into Gaza. Following Israel’s takeover of the corridor, Israeli forces reported discovering at least 20 tunnels. On August 4, an unusually large tunnel, ten feet high, was found. Unconfirmed reports suggest that one tunnel may stretch beneath Egypt’s Rafah airport, to allow for the direct provision of weapons to Hamas from regional flights landing in the Sinai Peninsula.

The tunnel problem is not new. Hamas tunnels have been crisscrossing the Egypt-Gaza border since the early 2000s. In 2006, Yuval Diskin, then director of the Shin Bet, said that “the Egyptians know who the smugglers are and don’t deal with them … They received intelligence on this from us and didn’t use it.” In 2007, The New York Times reported that Israeli officials had sent videotapes to American officials showing Egyptian border guards aiding the smuggling.

Then, after the regime of Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi took control of Egypt in 2014, the Egyptians destroyed many of the tunnels, due to a policy stemming from the new regime’s belief that Hamas was inextricably linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which Cairo viewed as an existential threat. But by 2018, the tunnels began to operate again.

Why the Israelis didn’t sound the alarm is not clear. The Israeli government needs to explain itself. But so does Egypt, which allowed Hamas to operate the tunnels in violation of its treaty obligations.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?

These are important questions to answer. But Cairo’s culpability is by now crystal clear.

This should have broader implications beyond its bilateral relationship with Israel. Egypt appears to have directly undermined American diplomatic and strategic interests in the Middle East.

A debate is now raging in Israel about the Philadelphi Corridor. Some say Israel should give up control to ensure the release of hostages in pursuit of a ceasefire deal. Others say Israel can never leave the corridor to permanently stymie Hamas smuggling. This is a false binary. If anything, Israel must work with Washington to make sure that Egypt installs an Israeli-engineered underground security system that would prevent Hamas from exploiting the border in the future.

This is a directive that only Washington can issue.

For reasons unclear, the Biden administration has failed to call out Egypt, let alone demand answers.

Nobody wants this important peace to unravel. But that doesn’t mean we should ignore the problem. The U.S. Congress should consider conditioning aid until Egypt upholds its obligations.

In the meantime, Cairo must begin to acknowledge the security problems that have only grown over the years, contributing to the October 7 attacks and the regional war that followed.

Jonathan Schanzer is the Senior Vice President for Research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on X @JSchanzer. Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at the FDD. Follow her on X @themariamwahba.